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ABSTRACT

Commonalities between the philosophical perspectives of Alfred Schatz, a European phenomenologist, and George Herbert Mead, the father of symbolic interactionism, are discussed, and the two men's potential significance in social science research is examined. Both men were concerned with the question of the nature of social action, believing that this question must be addressed before any successful scientific social inquiry can take place. Concern for conceptual and methodological problems is reflected in the works of both. Schutz and Mead share a modernist image of man in the world. This image posits a formulation of man that is not reducible to essence or natural laws. The modernist image of man is man in action; it suggests an action paradigm for the study of men. For the study of political science, this modernist image offers a more complete and complex image of political man, attempting to combine an ontological formulation, images of social reality, empirical observation, and normative and practical concerns. Political scientists should abandon the Newtonian image of man and work toward a more comprehensive modernist image that would unite the social sciences in an investigation of the complete human act. (RM)

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Phenomenology and Symbolic Interactionism: Recommendations for Social Science Research

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Phenomenology and Symbolic Interactionism:

Recommendations for Social Science Research

Alfred Schutz, a European phenomenologist, and George Herbert Mead, the father of Symbolic Interactionism, represent two distinct philosophical schools. Although much of their work can not be compared in detail, there exist certain commonalities in the major dimensions of their work (Combs, 1973, p. 61). Both scholars were concerned with the question of the nature of social action. Both Schutz and Mead believed that this question must be addressed before any successful scientific social inquiry could take place. This concern for conceptual and methodological problems is reflected in both of their work (see Combs, 1973, pp. 61-62).

Similarly, Schutz and Mead may be viewed as having an ontological focus in their work. Ontology may be defined as "a branch of methaphysics relating to the nature and relations of being" (Webster's 1965, p. 590). Schutz and Mead were concerned with a particular area of inquiry in ontology, human action. "This type of inquiry has recently been termed 'descriptive metaphysics,' and takes as one of it's central concerns the ontology of action, or treating the permanent relationships necessary and sufficient for the 'metaphysical description' of human actions" (Combs, 1973, p. 5).

It may be argued that Schutz and Mead share a "modernist image" of man in the world. According to Weinstein, the study of man has been an attempt to "locate" him in the world. The Western world has placed man in three different formulations. The Greeks and the medieval school of thought posited a "spirit" or divine being that led man in his actions with the world. The Newtonian model posited a mechanistic man who lived in causal relationships with other men and natural laws. The modernist image posits

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a formulation of man that is not reducible to "essence" or "natural laws" (see Combs, 1973, p. 11). Rather, "it attempts an encompassing Einsteinian vision of all aspects and phases of action" (Combs, 1973, p. 12; Weinstein, 1971; similarly, Gorman, 1980, lecture notes). Clearly then, Schutz and Mead share a "modernist image" of man in the world. The "modernist image" of man is man in action; it suggests an action paradigm for the study of man.

But, what does this "modernist image" of man add to the study of Political Science? "It offers a more complete and complex image of political man, attempting to combine an ontological formulation, images of social reality, empirical observations, and normative and practical concerns" (Combs, 1973, p. 73). According to Weinstein (1971), political scientists should abandon the Newtonian image of man and work towards a more comprehensive modernist image of man that would necessarily unite the social sciences in an investigation of "the complete human act" (pp. 243-249).

Although many political scientists pay lip service to the "era of post-behavioralism" which is based on this modernist image of man, few understand the conceptual and methodological ramifications of such an image. And many continue on with political science "as business as usual" in a mechanistic Newtonian manner. Both Schutz and Mead have their loyal followers; however, it must be understood that their ideas have not been met with wide-scaled acceptance. It is the purpose of this paper to examine Shutz and Mead's philosophical perspectives and their potential significance in social science research.

A discussion of Schutz and Mead's philosophical perspectives must begin with the German social philosopher, Georg Simmel. It may be noted that Simmel is considered the intellectual godfather of such theorists as Mead, Bentley, Schutz, Burke, and Duncan (see Combs, 1973, p. 20). Simmel was concerned with the nature of society. His approach was both ontological and sociological (see Spykman, 1925). He was concerned with the problem of "sociation", "the basic social interaction" (Combs, 1973, p. 21). Simmel believed that man lived in isolation; however, society was possible, because man joined together in a "conscious process which correlated the individual existence of the single element with that of the other, and which does so in certain forms and according to certain rules" (Simmel, 1959). Thus, "the individual is both of the world and in it, both a product of personality, or private self, and sociation, or public self" (Combs, 1973, p. 22; see Simmel, 1959, pp. 347-348). It is essential to understand the phenomenological structures of "sociation" in order to understand society and man in the world. Society emerges out of interaction; man views the world according to the patterns of rules which his group or society endorses.

Simmel's work is often confusing and contradictory. However, he laid the groundwork for the philosophical study of social action. This ontological analysis was developed more fully in the works of both Schutz and Mead.

Schutz

Alfred Schutz was born in Austria; however, he was forced to leave his Nazi-occupied country in 1938. It was at this point that he made the United States his home. Early in his career, he was exposed to the writings of Husserl, Weber, Simmel, Bergson, James, Scheler, and Mead (see Combs, 1973, p. 48). Schutz spent his intellectual life in the pursuit of "the philosophical illumination of the social world" (see Combs, 1973, p. 48; Gorman, 1977).

Although it is not possible to review the entire field of phenomenological thought, a brief attempt will be made to place Schutz's work in context. Edmund Husserl is the philosophical father of phenomenology. "This philosophy, distinct from all previous philosophical systems, aims at coming to terms with the world by accurately describing all its aspects as they appear in the subject's consciousness" (Gorman, 1977, p. 20). "Consequently, it is a philosophy which doubts the truthfulness of all socially accepted knowledge until it is absolutely confirmed by a method emphasizing the consciousness of perceiving observers" (Gorman, 1977, p. 20).

Husserl borrowed Brentano's "idea of intentionality" (Gorman, 1977, pp. 20-21). Man "intends" an object by "focusing consciousness on it and thereby bringing it to the attention of the subject" (Gorman, 1977, p. 21). Thus "all perceptual acts, where a subject becomes conscious of something, have a directional character, implying the active 'movement' of consciousness beyond itself to include (i.e., intend) an object within its sphere" (Gorman, 1977, p. 22). The process of intending is the "noesis", and the intentional object "the noema," is that which is intended, or the product of the noesis.

The noema contains apperceived and non-perceived elements that lead the subject into accepting "horizons of typicality." Horizons of typicality are the "accepted social meaning patterns" for a group or a society. The meaning an object has for us is colored by the meaning which society has placed on it. This every day world, the world we view as real, is the "Lebenswelt", the life-world (see Gorman, 1977, pp. 22-29). The "Lebenswelt" is a product of our society, our culture, and the times in which we live.

Husserl believed that in order to reach a state of "absolute knowledge," man must strip himself of his horizons of typicality by suspending belief

in the Lebenswelt. Through a process known as the "phenomenological reduction", man must bracket out (an epoche') the Lebenswelt. The phenomenological reduction is "the entire process of suspending belief in the world and in one's self" (Gorman, 1977, p. 24). Once the world is bracketed, a "phenomenological residue", is left, i.e., pure consciousness. Consciousness, then, "is the basis of all conceivable knowledge" (Gorman, 1977, p. 25). It is at this point that a second phenomenological reduction on pure consciousness takes place. Husserl believed that man would at this point through the second or "transcendental phenomenological reduction" reach the transcendental ego or the universal essence of consciousness. "In our experiences as transcendental egos we constitute absolute, apodictic knowledge" (Gorman, 1977, p. 26). By experiencing the transcendental ego, man may discover truth. For Husserl. scientific knowledge was separate from the Lebenswelt, apart from the noema; it existed in the universal transcendental reality that man can discover only through phenomenological reductions that lead him to the transcendental ego.

Schutz focuses his attention primarily on the Lebenswelt and how man should go about studying it. According to Schutz, man has a "natural attitude" toward the world in which he lives, that is "based on a belief in the validity of that world and a pragmatic orientation to acting in it" (Combs, 1973, p. 50). Every man has a unique "biographical situation" (a personal and social context) that helps him "make sense of the world." Our "biographical situation" contains a "stock of knowledge at hand" which "constitutes the unique pattern or scheme by which we assimilate new events and experiences in an orderly, systematic way" (Gorman, 1977, p. 38). These "stocks of knowledge" are composed of the patterns of behavior that we have learned in the Lebenswelt, i.e., rules

of typicality. Man's store of knowledge is in flux. He learns or accumulates these rules of typicality throughout his life as he moves from situation to situation and as the situation itself evolves. Thus, Schutz viewed man as an active creature, making sense of the Lebenswelt and then acting on his personal definition "of the situation."

Schutz maintains that action may be "presented" to oneself in three stages:

> My action as it takes place presents itself to me as a series of existing and present experiences, experiences that are coming to be and passing away. My intended...action presents itself to me as a series of future experiences. My terminated, completed act (which is my expired action) presents itself to me as a series of terminated experiences which I contemplate in memory. (1967, p. 39).

Meaning and action are one. Meaning is not something "behind" action. Meaning can not be "added to" action. Meaning is "in" action. Man goes beyond himself in a temporal context by considering the past, the present, and the future. He imagines the action and the consequences of the action. Thus, social actions are minded behavior, and a "temporality of motives" must be considered (see Combs, 1973, p. 54).

Schutz distinguishes between "because of" motives and "in order to" motives. Because of motives are variables in life that "cause" or "lead" man to act in a certain way, i.e., personality, race, religion, social class, etc. However, these "causes" are not enough to understand man's behavior. For man is more than a set of characteristics, he is a minded animal. "People project their actions, plan, and anticipate meaning for those proposed actions" (Combs, 1973, p. 54). Man, thus, has "in order to" motives.

However, these actions do not occur in a world without "others." Man enters into "we-relationships" in which he constructs "ideal-types" of behavior patterns which are deemed appropriate for himself and "the others" (see Natanson, 1970, pp. 1-22). "Social reality, then, is typified out of these relations, both in what constitutes ideal personal types and what types of action are considered appropriate" (Combs, 1973, p. 56). Man in the social world interacts in a situation of "reciprocity of perspectives" (Schutz, 1962, pp. 315-316). Man experiences "the other" by anticipating "the other's" actions. He in turn anticpates his response to the anticpated action of "the other."

Schutz's work is very complex, and only a small portion has been presented here. However, it may be seen that Schutz viewed man as an active creature that lived in and helped create the Lebenswelt. Unlike Husserl, he failed to reject the general methodological principles associated with social science. Subjectivity for Schutz, is not one side of the coin with heads as subjectivity and tails as objectivity. Rather Schutz focused on the "structure of intentionality", man's motivated connection with his world (i.e., his subjective connection with the world) (see Combs, 1973, p. 58). Natanson suggests that "...consciousness is conceived of as a unity in which the 'subjective' is already in direct connection with the objects of its intentional concern because those 'objects' are part of the unified structure of the streams of consciousness--not 'things' but meant correlates of the acts which intend them" (1968, p. 231). For Schutz, the rules of typicality which exist in a state of flux in the "natural attitude" of the Lebenswelt should be the focus of social science research.

Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) have attempted to build on

Schutz's "social construction of reality," and Harold Garfinkel (1967), influenced by Schutz's concentration on the Lebenswelt, has developed a scientific method known as ethnomethodology. However, the impact of Schutz on American social science remains unclear. He is widely criticized by both "main stream" social scientists and other phenomenologists (see Gorman, 1980, np. lecture notes).

Mead

George Herbert Mead is most often credited as the "father of symbolic interactionism" (Littlejohn, 1977, p. 86). Mead himself did not publish any systematic statement of his theory. All four of his books on the subject were posthumously collected and edited. The books: Philosophy of the Present (1932); Mind, Self and Society (1934); Movements of Thought in the 19th Century (1936); and Philosophy of the Act (1938) are rather disjointed attempts by his former students and followers to present a complete picture of his life's work. In addition to Mead, early foundations of symbolic interactionist theory may be found in the writings of C. H. Cooley, John Dewey, J. M. Baldwin, Willian James, and W. I. Thomas.

Symbolic interactionism is both a theoretical perspective within social psychology as well as a methodological orientation. Proponents of this approach to the social sciences believe that "symbolic interaction is both the medium for the development of human beings and the process by which human beings associate as human beings" (Meltzer, 1972, p. 18). This version of how the human world operates necessitates a particular methodological perspective. Thus for the symbolic interactionist, theory and research are intertwined in their study of human behavior.

Mead believed that in the study of social behavior, the basic datum is

the social act. This implies that there is a fundamental social dimension in the development of human beings and the process by which they engage in living, i.e., their associations with other human beings. Mead himself never used the term "symbolic interactionism;" he designated his perspective as "social behaviorism." It was Herbert Blumer who coined the term in 1937 (Blumer, 1969, p. 1).

Symbolic interactionism has a rich, heterogeneous background. This has led to many diversified schools of thought within symbolic interactionism. Currently, there are the Meadian interactionists represented by Herbert Blumer; the Self theorists represented by the late Manford H. Kuhn (see Meltzer & Petras, 1972, pp. 43-57); the ethnomethodologists represented by Denzin (1969); the dramaturgists represented by Goffman (1959); and the dramatists represented by Burke (1966) and Duncan (1962) (see Howard, 1980).

Thus there is no one interpretation of symbolic interactionism. This paper will primarily focus on the approach of the Meadian interactionists, for it is the most consistent of the schools in its application of both theory and methodology. The Meadian school headed by Blumer is clearly in the postpositivist phase of social science research (see Delia, 1977, pp. 79-80). Although Mead gave birth to symbolic interactionism, the "filling out" of his theory was left to his followers, for this reason, this paper will utilize the explications of symbolic interactionism found in the works of Mead (1934), Blumer (1969; 1956), Meltzer (1972), Rose (1962), Meltzer and Petras (1972), Denzin (1969), and Hall (1972; 1977). In addition to the Meadian interactionists, the dramatist school led by Burke (1945; 1950; 1966; 1976) and Duncan (1962; 1968) will be briefly considered.

Meaning is the key to understanding symbolic interactionism, for "its establishment and consequences are the lifeblood of human activity" (Hall, 1972, p. 37). Meaning is not a property intrinsic to an object which is

being observed, nor is it the psychological predispositions of the observer. Rather it is the meaning which is created through the process of social interaction. Thus, "fortunately or unfortunately meaning is not intrinsic in events, facts, people, or 'situations' nor are facts 'publicly observable'" (Vatz, 1973, p. 156). Meanings are social products, "creations that are formed in and through the defining activities of people as they interact" (Blumer, 1969, p. 5). In recapitulation, there are three basic aspects of meaning in symbolic interactionism. First, meaning is extrinsic. Second, meaning is behavorial, and thirdly, it is created through the communication process of social interaction (see Hall, 1972, pp. 37-39).

Man is born into a world of complex actions. "The life of any human society consists of an on going process of fitting together the activities of its members" (Blumer, 1969, p. 7). Both culture and social structures are derived through activity and continuously evolve through human activity. Man is born into a complex social environment as well as a physical environment. Man is stimulated by both signals and symbols. A signal is part of the physical world, and its meaning is intrinsic (see Frank, 1966, p. 3 ; Meltzer, 1972, p. 13). A symbol has "a learned meaning and value for people, and man's response to a symbol is in terms of its meaning and value rather than in terms of its physical stimulation of his sense organs" (Rose, 1962, p.5). Man is viewed as a "symbol-using animal" (Burke, 1966, p. 16), for he has a distinctive capacity for symbolic communication. Man alone has the vocal ability to make a "large number and wide range of different sounds," and man alone has the nervous system capable of storing the "meanings and values of millions of symbols" (Rose, 1962, p. 7). Language then is viewed as "symbolic action" (Burke, 1966, p. 16) which is acquired through social

interaction. The importance of language in symbolic interactionism must be stressed, for it is through language (symbolic action) that man acquires the meanings necessary for functional social behavior. Thus, "we live as humans by and for symbols" (Frank, 1966, p. 14).

Consequently, symbolic interactionists view the process of socialization as a process of social interaction. The self is the "organization of qualities (attributes and roles) that the individual attributes to himself" (Kinch, 1973, p. 224). The individual develops a self concurrently with his use of role-taking. Role-taking is defined as the "establishment for ego of the meaning of the other, i.e., the discovery of the line of action that gives the specific acts of the other a direction, coherence, and significance" (Hall, 1972, p. 39). By taking the role of others, the individual begins to see himself as an object. This enables the individual to get outside of oneself and analyze and define the situation in terms of "others." Man can not only take on the role of a single "other," but he can also take on the roles of a "generalized other" (see Rose, 1962, pp. 8-9). The self is a social process within the individual which involves the negotiation of two roles, the "I" and the "Me." The "I" is the impulsive tendency of an individual, while the "Me" is the "incorporated other within the individual" (see Meltzer, 1972, p. 10). The "I" is the source of creativity and propulsion, and it is governed by the goal-directed, conforming hand of the "Me" (Meltzer, 1972, p. 11).

Thus, the symbolic interactionist view of man is an active one. Man interacts with himself through a social process of internal dialogue of making indications to himself about himself and about others. Thus man's behavior is minded; it is constructed behavior. The mind is defined as the process which "manifests itself whenever the individual is interacting

with himself by using...symbols" (Meltzer, 1972, p. 12). "The mental process is, then, one of delaying, organizing, and selecting a response to the stimuli of the environment" (Meltzer, 1972, p. 13). People act then toward situations. Action emerges from the meaning of the situation decided on by the individual during the symbolic interaction process.

This view of self implies that an individual is a society in minature, for an individual has an internal dialogue. This inner experience of the individual, the internal dialogue, is the mind. Through this process an individual is able to actively seek goals, directing and controlling his behavior (see discussion, Meltzer, 1972, p. 11). This is the distinctive element of human action; for, it is purposive, minded, symbolic behavior. The significance of this according to Mead is that people act--not merely react (Meltzer, 1972, p. 16). The unit of study then for the symbolic interactionist is "the act." The act includes both overt behavior and the internal dialogue (or covert behavior) which brings about the act. "The act, then, encompasses the total process involved in human activity" (Meltzer, 1972, p. 16).

This view of human action may be applied to collective action in which numbers of individuals are involved. Collective action may be thought of as being characteristic of groups, organizations, societies, systems etc. Such social behavior involves the individuals fitting lines of action together or rather involves individuals negotiating various avenues of action. These interlinkages of action create "joint action"--"a societal organization of conduct of different acts of diverse participants" (Blumer, 1969, p. 17). Joint action arises out of the interpretive interactions of competing definitions of the situation. What results is an "intersubjective reality," the negotiated

product of clashing subjective realities. This "intersubjective reality" is shared meaning. The process is consensual validation through symbolic negotiation (Blumer, 1969; Duncan, 1962; Brummett, 1976, Rose, 1962). The joint action consequently is synergistic. It can not be analyzed in terms of the participants, for it was created by the participants through the process of symbolic interaction (Hall, 1972, p. 41).

Thus societies, groups, organizations, etc., are all negotiated order. What we take for organizational structures, rules, norms, etc., are in reality a conglomerate of shared agreements which much continually be reaffirmed through the process of negotiation (Strauss, 1963, pp. 147-169). Strauss suggests that:

> Pushing our logic to its extreme, we might even argue that the idea of 'nation' or 'society' is only a fiction and that, if the sociologist subscribes to this common sense fiction, rather than viewing a nation or society as an exceedingly complex arena (with attendant exceedingly complex negotiation), he may fall into the deadly trap of merely studying the fiction as if it were a fact. (1964, p. 377).

Hall maintains that the negotiated order model is useful in the study of politics, for it depicts social objects as problematic and conflictual and the accommodation of these societal tensions through the process of bargaining and negotiation (1972, p. 43). The model of society which derives from this negotiated order "is one characterized by a complex network of competing groups and individuals acting to control, maintain, or improve their social conditions as defined by their self-interests" (Hall, 1972, p. 45). Hall maintains that this best approximates social behavior in the arena of politics. It must be pointed out that individuals engaged in the political negotiations of a society are limited by structural and cultural constraints, and the

symbolic interactionist perspective does not claim to explain these inequalities of power. However, it can analyze "the processes of interaction that result from these social conditions and is therefore able to explain the maintenance or change in those dimensions" (Hall, 1972, p. 46).

Hall has developed a method of addressing the problem of explaining participation and effectiveness of individuals in the bargaining process. He adds to the symbolic interactionist perspective of the negotiated order the concept of power. Power is defined as the "control or influence over the actions of others to promote one's goals without their consent, against their will or without their knowledge or understanding (for example by control of the physical, psychological, or sociocultural environment within which others must act)" (Buckley, 1967, p. 186). Hall stresses the notion that power is the ability "to define the situation" for others (1972, 1979). Hall labels the symbolic interaction process used to define the situation impression management (1972; 1977). He writes:

> Impression management means that control over conduct of others for one's own interest is achieved by influencing the definition of the situation in which all are involved. This is accomplished by acting in such a way that an image is created of the actor (and related objects) that lead others to voluntarily act as the actor wishes them to act. (1977, p. 2)

Obviously, impression management, a symbolic interactional process, is a useful tool in the study of power relationships. Through control over information flow and the use of a variety of symbolic devices, an impression manager attempts to define the situation for his audience. It must be

recognized that this is not a hypodermic needle presentation of persuasion, rather it is consistent with symbolic interactionism in that "the definition of the situation" is the joint action, intersubjective reality of the participants. It is a negotiated order. Impression management merely attempts to study and explain means of entering and engaging in the negotiation process (see Johnson, 1982a; 1982b), the drama called politics. Duncan has described the symbolic interactional system known as politics as a continuous "drama of hierarchy in which superiors, inferiors, and equals communicate by symbols which they believe will create and sustain social order" (1962, p. 436).

Symbolic interactionism has been criticized on several counts. First, there are no absolutes for the symbolic interactionist. Terms such as "apriori truth" or "apodictic knowledge" are foreign to symbolic interactionism. "Truth" is not an absolute, but rather it is a "negotiated truth." "Truth" is created through social interactions. However, it is not static, for it is an ever-changing "truth" that shifts with the changing tides of societial interaction.

Secondly, it has been argued that symbolic interactionism is a theory of solipsism. Solipsism has been defined as "a theory holding that the self can know nothing but its own modifications and that the self is the only existent reality" (Webster's, 1965, p. 831). Because symbolic interactionism focuses its attention on the "subjective world", on man and more specifically, man in action or interaction with other men, it is labeled as "solipsistic." However, a careful examination of the school's concepts leads one to a much different conclusion. Early symbolic interactionists posited that man had a personal reality. In 1959, Boulding pursued the early symbolic interactionists' line of thought in his book The Image.

In this work, he uses the word "image" to indicate "a subjective knowledge of the world...that is built up as a result of all past experiences of the possessor of the image" (1959, pp. 5-6). An individual believes his image to be true, and he bases his behavior on his image. However, an individual's image is "a reflection of reality, not definitive knowledge of it" (Nimmo & Savage, 1976, p. 8). The image is formed and modified through the process of social interaction. Following the symbolic interactionists strain of belief that meaning is created through an evolving interpretative process, Boulding suggests, "The meaning of a message is the change which it produces in the image" (1959, p. 7). Meaning is not "inside" man, but rather it is created in a reciprocal, transactional process between man and his environment. In order to make Boulding's statement clearer, it may be restated: "The meaning of the encounter is the change which it produces in the image".

Thirdly, symbolic interactionism does not endorse any particular view of the "ideal society" or the "ideal government." A society or a governmental system is viewed as a "negotiated order" that is continually redefined through the process of social interaction. Rather, than imposing a set ideological structure on the views of people and evaluating their views in terms of these preconceived-researcher-set ideologies, symbolic interactionists are studying the organizational principles which people use themselves in structuring and evaluating their political reality. The researchers then seek to discover patterns of organization within groups of people.

Fourthly, symbolic interactionism has been labeled a "passive" theory of social life. Symbolic interactionists are accused of passively observing but not acting. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Symbolic interactionism

is both sensitive to "what is" and "what can be". In order to illustrate this point, dramatism will now be discussed. Dramatism is more appropriately thought of as a method of analysis rather than a separate school of thought.

"Dramatism is a method of analysis and a corresponding critique of terminology designed to show that the most direct route to the study of human relations and human motives is via a methodological inquiry into cycles or clusters of terms and their functions" (Burke, 1976, p. 7). Human life is drama, and researchers observe actors each with a unique motive acting out their roles in a setting. This perspective is associated with two fields of academic inquiry, literary criticism and symbolic interactionism.

Kenneth Burke (1945; 1950; 1966; 1976) is perhaps the most famous of the dramatists. Burke suggests that the fact that man is a symbol-using animal is obvious enough but that the ramifications of such an idea are not fully understood. He writes:

> The 'symbol-using animal,' yes obviously. But can we bring ourselves to realize just what that formula implies, just how overwhelimingly much of what we mean by 'reality' has been built up for us through nothing but our symbol systems. What is our 'reality' for today (beyond the paper-thin line of our particular lives) but all this clutter of symbols about the past combined with whatever things we know mainly through maps, magazines, newspapers, and the like about the present? The whole overall 'picture' is but a construct of our symbol systems. To mediate on this fact until one sees its full implications is much like peering over the edge of things into an ultimate abyss. And doubtless that's one reason why though man is typically the symbol-using animal, he clings to a naive verbal realism that refuses to realize the full extent of the role played by symbolicity in his notions of reality (1966, p. 5).

Thus, Burke believes that the human capacity for "symbolizing creates language, which forever separates the symbol-using animal from the simplicity and innocence of his 'sheer animality'" (Combs, 1973, pp. 85-86).

"Human action in any culture derives from man's symbolic resources; to Burke, language is a motive in itself, the resources that makes social action possible" (Combs, 1973, p. 86). Men see and act in the world on the basis of their "perceptual or terministic screens" which help them define what the world is like. Much of what we believe to be true about the world is simply an implication "of the particular terminology in terms of which the observations are made" (Burke, 1966, p. 50).

Lippmann in his discussion of stereotypes addresses this point. It may be said that it is the role of the dramatist to "uncover or discover" these terministic screens or stereotypes. Lippmann writes:

> What matters is the character of the stereotypes, and the gullibility with which we employ them. And these in the end depend upon those inclusive patterns which constitute our philosophy of life. If in that philosophy we assume that the world is codified according to a code which we possess, we are likely to make our reports of what is going on describe a world run by our code. But if our philosophy tells us that each man is only a small part of the world, that his intelligence catches at best only phases and aspects in a coarse net of ideas, then, when we use our stereotypes, we tend to know that they are only stereotypes, to hold them lightly, to modify them gladly. We tend, also, to realize more and more clearly when our ideas started, where they started, how they came to us, why we accepted them. All useful history is antiseptic in this fashion. It enables us to know what fairy tale, what school book, what tradition, what novel, play, picture, phrase, planted one preconception in this mind, another in that mind (1965, p. 60).

Dramatists attempt to uncover the drama of human interactions. "Put in the language of the dramatistic view, human behavior consists of symbolic acts that make up theatrical performances, that is, people presenting themselves to each other to influence their mutual impressions of one another and their joint expectations of what must be done to sustain the performance" (Nimmo, 1974, p. 133). "Role is the aspect of society <u>in</u> man; society provides the script, the man plays the role variously--with verve, mechanically

or however" (Combs & Mansfield, 1976, pp. 19-20).

In A Grammar of Motives, Burke developed a dramatistic approach to the study of human behavior that attempts to "attribute motives." He identified five key elements (the pentad) in any dramatic presentation.

> They are: Act, Scene, Agent, Agency, Purpose. In a rounded statement about motives, you must have some word that names the act (names what took place, in thought, or deed, and another that names the scene (the background of the act, the situation in which it occured); also, you must indicate what person or kind of person (agent), performed the act, what means or instruments he used (agency), and the purpose. Men may violently disagree about the purpose behind a given act, or about the character of the person who did ti, or how he did it, or in what kind of situation he acted; or they may even insist upon totally different words to name the act itself. But be that as it may, any complete statement about motives will offer some kind of answers to these live questions: what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent) how he did it (agency) and why (purpose). (1965, p. xv).

The element which one stresses may be assigned a ratio. The ratios are "principles of selectivity," those elements of the pentad one chooses to stress. This is true of social interactions and social science interactions. Burke illustrates:

> For the featuring of scene, the corresponding philosophic terminology is materialism.
> For the featuring of agent, the corresponding terminology is idealism.
> For the featuring of agency, the corresponding terminology is pragmatism.
> For the featuring of purpose, the corresponding terminology is mysticism.
> For the featuring of act, the corresponding terminology is is realism. (1965, p. 128).

Burke's philosophical aim is to uncover drama both in social science research and the every day world. His concerns are basically ethical. "His purpose is to 'purify' human life by making men realize what it is they are about and why they are about it. Dramatism as a 'method' would alert men to

the fact that our view of ourselves and society is linguistically determined, i.e., that we see the world through a 'fog of symbols '" (Combs, 1973, p. 120). If we are aware of the dramas we are enacting, then perhaps we can avoid the excesses or disasters that may accompany them (Combs, 1973, p. 120).

Burke believes that man creates "ideal types" or "perfection principles." When societies fail to reach these socially determined "ideal types", they seek out sacrificial victims in order to purge themselves of guilt they are experiencing from failing to meet the "ideal expectations." This symbolically alleviates the societal tensions resulting from the guilt. This purging may have drastic results for society. Burke uses the Hitler genocide era as an example of a society unconscious of the drama they were enacting. The identification of "Fifth Columnists" by the far right today in the American political arena is also another dangerous drama. The identification of homosexuals, blacks, Jews, Catholics, and women as "fifth columnists" which prevent American society from reaching its "moral destiny" in the world is an enactment of the sacrificial offering. Today, in Burke's terms, America is in Act I or II of their play. If the course of the play is not changed, the catharsis may take place in the third act. The catharsis may take the form of social exclusiveness, religious persecution, racial or sexual persecution or discrimination, or genocide.

By identifying the drama and its parts, Burke hopes to awaken man to his "separate and isolated" situation. Burke hopes that by realizing "how much language makes over the world on symbolic categories, one may then realize both the nature of the drama one is enacting, and the possible disasters thay may result from it" (Combs, 1973, p. 120).

Obviously, Burke views the social scientist's role as one of actively defining social dramas. Kenneth Burke along with Duncan (1962; 1968), Hall (1972, 1977), Klapp (1964), Edelman (1964), and Johnson (1982a; 1982b) provide a rich literature that must be taken as an activist comment on how to go about changing society. Insights into how power is realized, how leaders actively define the situation (public dramas) for their followers, and how an individual may "actively" pursue a course of action that would change the public drama provide a rich primer for the potential social change agent. Although, symbolic interactionism does not endorse any societal system or worldly truths, it does provide an activist concept of man in society that is translated into very practical "method" of man living in the world.

In addition to the criticisms already mentioned, Symbolic interactionism has been criticized for failing to deal with the emotional dimension of human conduct (Manis & Meltzer, 1972). However, the symbolic interactionist perspective does include the emotional side of man. It does not claim that man's goal seeking strategies are practical or logical, and nor does it claim that man's subjective reality necessarily approximates reality. Similarly, it has been criticized for failing to come to grips with the unconscious. However, symbolic interaction stresses that man's behavior is a product of his past, his present, and his expectations of the future. His unconscious is a part of his past and is handled by his internal dialogue, for the unconscious "colors" the interactors or role actors, the "I" and the "Me."

Most significantly, the symbolic interactionist school has received severe methodological criticism. However, this criticism is grounded in

two different ways of looking at the world. One world view is "logical empiricism" or the "positivisitic view" of science and its role (Delia, 1977, p. 66). Berlo has summarized the premises of such a view:

1. Data should be restricted to that which is directly observable....
2. Theory is more important than correlative data, and 'sciences' can be ranked by their relative dependence on theory and data.
3. The physicist is correct in his view of nature as deterministic, external, fixed, processual only in a Newtonian sense. (1977, p.16).

This world view uses a variable analysis methodology. Variable analysis is "the examination of communication in terms of the influence of discrete factors (variables) upon communication outcomes (effects)" (Delia, 1977, p. 72). According to Smith, it is ironic that in this age of scientific discovery, social scientists are viewing the world as did the scholars of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries in a mechanistic, deterministic, Newtonian mind-set (1972, p. 17

Alfred North Whitehead by the year 1929 had developed a new way of looking at the world and a new meaning for the word "process." He wrote:

> The how an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity is; so that the two descriptions of an actual entity are not independent. Its 'being' is constituted by its 'becoming.' This is the principle of process. (pp. 34-35).

Although this notion of social life was paid lip service, it was not translated into how researchers studied the world. Smith (1972), Blumer (1956), and Berlo (1977) have all noted that there is an extreme paradox in social science's acceptance of the Whiteheadian theory of communication as process and the simultaneous retention of a causal, deterministic, linear methodological frame.

It is this paradox that the symbolic interactionist methodological

perspective addresses. Symbolic interactionists call for a "unification of theory and method" (Delia, 1977, p. 76). Blumer similarly maintains that "the procedures employed in each part of the act of scientific inquiry should and must be assessed in terms of whether they respect the nature of the empirical world under study--whether what they signify of imply to be the nature of the empirical world is actually the case" (1969, p. 27).

Blumer believes that it is the job of social scientists "to make society intelligible" (Meltzer & Petras, 1972, p. 46). He maintains that a new methodology must be developed in order to attempt to "get inside the experience of the actor." Blumer suggests that through exploration a researcher may come to a "close and comprehensive acquaintance with a sphere of social life," and because of this, the researcher will have sharpened ideas of how to inquire, how to collect, and how to analyze data (1969, pp. 39-40). The researcher must then engage in inspection of the sphere of social life. Inspection is the "intensive focused examination of the empirical content of whatever analytical elements are used for purposes of analysis, and this same kind of examination of the empirical nature of the relations between such elements" (Blumer, 1969, p. 43).

Guided by Blumer's suggestions, symbolic interactionists have developed a variety of research techniques. Stephenson (1967) has created Q-methodology in which "every measurement made is subjective and central-to-self of the person who performs a Q-sort" (p. 11). Stephenson believes that this process approaches the internal dialogue. In a less rigorous enterprise, Cataldo (1970) has developed a card-sort that allows an individual to self-label himself. Both the Q-sort and the card-sort "allow the person to define the range of

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application of his constructs and to instruct us on how events are ordered within them" (Delia, 1977, p. 77). Other techniques have also been used. Brown (1974) has introduced the notion of an "intensive" analysis done through case studies. And as previously stated, Burke (1966) uses a dramaturgical pentad analysis in his work. Above all, symbolic interactionists believe that multiple observers and multiple methods should be used in any research situation so that an individual researcher's bias might be in some way accounted for in terms of conclusions drawn from the study (see Denzin, 1969).

Perhaps the greatest contribution of symbolic interaction to methodology has been the resulting scientific interest in the scientific process itself. Delia (1977) and Denzin (1969) have observed that scientists are now aware that they themselves operate within a culture (a scientific culture), a culture complete with biases. Additionally, it has been recognized that the interaction between the subject and the researcher must be studied, for the interaction affects the data (Denzin, 1969). Symbolic interactionism has injected a healthy notion into the scientific world. And that notion creates an environment where conflict is legitimate, and it is not only deemed legitimate, but it is valued for its own sake. Before, various perspectives within a field (Political Science, Sociology, etc.) were in some way embarassing, because the discipline had not reached a point of accepting "one grandiose theory." Symbolic interaction suggests that as researchers are human and as their methods are creations of humans, then there can be and justifiably so, a variety of answers to any problem (Denzin, 1969).

Criticism that labels symbolic interactionism as "soft" in methodology is based on a positivistic notion of social science research. It is not grounded in theory, but in the habits of researchers.

In recapitulation, symbolic interaction presents mind, self, and society in microcosm. It describes and illuminates human behavior by showing how individuals "share one another's behavior instead of merely responding to each other's overt behavior" (Manis & Meltzer, 1972, p. 577). The theoretical concepts intertwine and mutually imply one another (see Meltzer, 1972, p. 18). And the approach has a distinctive methodology that is consistent with its theoretical perspective. Symbolic interactionism is useful in the study of political science, for it is designed "to deal with the vitality and reality of a social life which has a political system that never stops or runs down but faces new contingencies, issues, groups, conditions, and decisions as well as the reinterpretation of formerly rationalized matters" (Hall, 1972, p. 70).

Commonalities

It has been suggested that certain philosophical commonalities exist between Schutz's European Phenomenology and Mead's Symbolic Interactionism. Both schools of thought were influenced by the early writings of Georg Simmel. Both are concerned with a philosophical formulation of social action. Both have addressed the ontological problems of social research. And, both paint a modernist image of man, for man is regarded as an "active" creature that can not be explained or understood by notions of "essence" or "natural laws" that force man to act in certain ways. Both suggest an action paradigm for the study of man.

Schutz's concept of man "intending" his environment is an activist view that approximates the symbolic interactionist's view of man "creating" or "constructing" his world.

According to Schutz, man is born into a personal and social context known as the "biographical situation." Through the process of "intending" man comes to "know" the world. What man "knows" is a part of the biographical situation which Schutz calls the "stock of knowledge at hand." He defines the "stock of knowledge at hand" as "the unique pattern or scheme by which we assimilate new events and experiences in an orderly, systematic way" (Gorman, 1977, p. 38). This is very close to the symbolic interactionist's concept of "the image," "a subjective knowledge of the world...that is built up as a result of all past experiences of the possessor the image" (Boulding, 1959, pp. 5-6). The "image" helps man "make sense out of his world." Both concepts "stock of knowledge at hand" and "the image" contain a notion that man can transcend himself temporally through minded consideration of his past, the realization of the present, and the anticipation of the future.

For Schuts, the notion of temporal transcendence takes place during minded behavior, the act of anticipating. For Mead and the symbolic interactists, the transcendence takes place during minded behavior, the internal dialogue. Man is able to "go beyond" himself through mental activity. Both of these processes allows man to successfully engage in social action. Schutz describes man's ability to anticipate or engage in "we-relationships." During, "we-relationships", man constructs "ideal-types" of behavior patterns which are deemed appropriate for himself and others. Thus, according to Schutz, man in the social world interacts in a situation of "reciprocity of perspectives". Man experiences "the other" by anticipating "the other's" actions. He in turn anticipates his response to the anticipated action of "the other." Similarly, Meadian interactionists maintain that through the process of the internal

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dialogue man is able to "take on roles," or engage in role-taking. By taking the role of others, the individual begins to see himself as an object. This enables the individual to get outside of oneself and analyze and define the situation in terms of "others." Man can not only take on the role of a single "other", but he can also take on the roles of a "generalized other" (see Rose, 1962, pp. 8-9). The generalized other is man's expectations of the behavior of others.

The reciprocity of perspectives is contained, according to Schutz, in the "natural attitude". The reciprocity of perspectives are the "rules of society" or in Husserl's terms, "the rules of typicality." Man acts on the basis of his "natural attitude." According to Meadian interactionists, an "intersubjective reality" is negotiated through a process of clashing personal realities. This intersubjective reality is the "negotiated reality" of society, Man acts in society on the basis of this "negotiated reality." Schutz's focus is on a man's natural attitude. The Meadian interactionists are focusing on the "shared, negotiated image" of a group or society of people. Yet, the ramifications are the same: man learns the ways of society through interacting with other men.

Both Schutz and Meadian interactionists address the ontological problems of social science research. Man's experience is synergistic. Man can not be understood by separating his experiences into distinct spheres of behavior, political, sociological, psychological, etc. Rather man must be regarded in his totality. Unlike Husserl, Schutz does not try to rid himself of the "Lebenswelt". Rather it is the rules of typicality which exist in a state of flux in the "natural attitude" of the Lebenswelt that should be the focus

of social science research. Similarly, Meadian interactionists do not attempt to reject the "day-to-day" world, for man is of his environment, and he can not be separated from it. Man carries on an internal dialogue through a symbolic device called language. Language is learned in society, through a negotiation process that constructs meaning and assigns symbols. Man can not therefore, escape the social world for the device that allows man "minded behavior" is "of" the world.

In conclusion, Schutz's European Phenomenology and Mead's Symbolic Interactionism share certain philosophical concepts and methodological concerns. Both schools share a modernist image of man and seek to understand man through an action paradigm.

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